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1 Introduction
Can horizontal mergers improve social welfare? We address this important ques-
tion through analyzing a model that explicitly incorporates vertical relationships
between industries. Vertical relationships are common and important. Final-goods
producers often procure intermediate products from upstream firms, and sell their
products through downstream retailers. Horizontal mergers yield richer implications
under vertical relationships because they affect not only merging firms’ market power
but also the nature of interactions between vertically related industries.
Standard modeling choices to analyze vertical relationships include bilateral
oligopoly and successive oligopoly models. The former types of models view ver-
tical relations through bilateral contracting, whereas the latter types view vertical
interactions through market interface with uniform contractual terms. We study
horizontal mergers under a successive oligopoly model and demonstrate that a hor-
izontal merger of downstream firms can increase welfare even if merging firms are
symmetric and the merger has no synergy or learning effects. We also show that the
qualitative nature of the results remain mostly unchanged for a horizontal merger
of upstream firms.
Consider a model in which M symmetric downstream firms can produce a ho-
mogeneous final product and face a downward-sloping inverse demand. Each down-
stream firm can transform one unit of an intermediate product into one unit of the
final product at a constant unit cost. Let N denote the number of upstream firms
that can produce the homogeneous intermediate product with constant marginal
costs (which may differ across firms). Upstream firms compete with each other by
choosing quantity and downstream firms also engage in quantity competition, in
which the input price r is determined at the market-clearing level and is taken as
given by all downstream firms.
Using the model outlined above, we study welfare effects of downstream mergers.
We first show that the merger reduces the equilibrium input price under a range
of parameterizations. We then demonstrate, under two different scenarios, that the
lower input price may result in higher welfare.
In the first scenario, we assume that the number of upstream firms N is fixed,
and show that the lower input price may increase welfare when upstream firms
have asymmetric costs. To understand the logic, suppose that the upstream sector
has only two firms, 1 and 2, with constant marginal costs c1 and c2, respectively,
satisfying c1 < c2. We interpret that (r− c1)/(r− c2) captures firm 1’s competitive
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advantage over firm 2 in terms of the price-cost margin. The lower input price
increases firm 1’s competitive advantage. To see this, suppose that the downstream
merger reduces the equilibrium input price from r∗ to r∗∗, r∗ > r∗∗. Then, firm 1’s
competitive advantage increases from (r∗− c1)/(r∗−c2) to (r∗∗− c1)/(r∗∗−c2). The
higher competitive advantage increases firm 1’s equilibrium market share, implying
that a larger fraction of the industry output is produced in the cost-efficient firm
when the input price is lower.
This effect (referred to as the production reallocation effect) works in the direc-
tion of increasing welfare under the downstream merger. Even though the merger
increases concentration in the downstream sector, it can still increase welfare if the
concentration effect is dominated by the production reallocation effect. We find
that the downstream merger reduces the equilibrium aggregate output due to the
concentration effect. Then, a necessary condition for the merger to increase welfare
is that it increases not only firm 1’s market share but also its output. We find that
this in fact happens under a range of parameterizations.
It is important to notice that the production reallocation effect just mentioned
is different from the so-called production reshuﬄing effect of horizontal mergers. To
see the difference, consider a standard Cournot oligopoly model (without a vertical
structure) consisting of firms A, B, and C, where firm A is more cost efficient than
firm B. Suppose that firms A and B merge. The merged firm would then produce
more output in A and less in firm B in equilibrium to minimize its overall produc-
tion cost. This production reshuﬄing works in the direction of increasing welfare.
Production reshuﬄing of this kind does not occur in our model because downstream
firms are assumed to be symmetric. Downstream mergers change the equilibrium
input prices, which in turn change the nature of competition in the upstream firms,
leading to the production reallocation effect in our model.
In the second scenario, we rule out the production reallocation effect by assuming
that upstream firms are symmetric. Instead, we endogenize the number of upstream
firms. Assume that a large number of potential entrants exist for the upstream
sector, where each potential entrant can enter by incurring a fixed entry cost. Once
the entry process is over, upstream firms engage in quantity competition. The
downstream merger again reduces the equilibrium aggregate output in this setup.
We find, however, that the merger can increase welfare when it reduces the input
price. The lower input price makes upstream entry less attractive, and hence reduces
the number of upstream entrants in equilibrium. In the presence of the fixed entry
cost, a smaller number of upstream firms implies that their average costs are lower.
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This effect, referred to as the rationalization effect of the upstream sector, works
in the direction of increasing welfare. We show that the positive welfare effect of
the downstream merger dominates its negative effect due to concentration under a
range of parameterizations.1
A key element of our results is the effect of horizontal mergers on input price.
A necessary condition for downstream mergers to increase welfare is that they re-
duce the equilibrium input price. Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) use the data of
United States company acquisitions between 1984 and 2003 to study the impact of
downstream mergers on upstream suppliers. They find that, in those more concen-
trated industries or industries with high entry barriers, upstream suppliers indeed
experienced large input price declines after consolidation in the downstream sector.
We study a general demand function with standard assumptions for the existence
and uniqueness of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and identify the necessary and
sufficient condition for downstream mergers to reduce the input price. We then
show that, although downstream mergers reduce aggregate output regardless of their
effects on input prices, they can improve welfare. For each of the two scenarios—
asymmetric upstream firms and free entry in the upstream sector—we identify the
necessary and sufficient condition for downstream mergers to increase welfare. We
also analyze upstream mergers in the successive oligopoly framework. While both
the final good price and the input price go up with upstream mergers, welfare can
still improve if the difference between the final good’s price and the input price
goes down. The squeeze in the downstream price-cost margin can improve welfare
through reallocation of output towards more efficient downstream firms (Section
5.1) or through rationalization of downstream sector (Section 5.2). We identify the
necessary and sufficient condition for upstream mergers to increase welfare.
2 Relationship to the literature
Welfare effects of horizontal mergers have been investigated previously in the
literature (Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983; Deneckere and Davidson, 1985;
Perry and Porter, 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990; McAfee and Williams, 1992).
1Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) show that, under a Cournot
oligopoly model with fixed set-up costs, the level of entry in the free-entry equilibrium is socially
excessive. Ghosh and Morita (2007) find that free entry can lead to a socially insufficient number
of firms in a successive oligopoly model, but it can still be socially excessive under a range of pa-
rameterizations. In the context of socially excessive entry, our findings tell us that the downstream
merger can increase welfare by mitigating the negative welfare effect of excessive entry.
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Farrell and Shapiro (1990) analyzed a Cournot oligopoly model with quite general
cost and demand functions to study the output and welfare effects of horizontal
mergers. Production reshuﬄing and synergy or learning associated with mergers
play important roles in their analyses. They found, among other things, that a
merger causes the price to rise if a merger generates no synergies or learning. More
recent analyses of horizontal mergers emphasize how dynamic interaction between
distinct mergers and the private information about synergies can affect post-merger
welfare (see, for example, Nocke and Whinston, 2010, 2013). Our contribution to
the horizontal merger literature is to evaluate the welfare consequences of horizontal
mergers under a model that incorporates vertical relationships between industries.
Several papers have previously studied horizontal mergers in bilateral oligopoly
models (see Horn and Wolinsky, 1988; Ziss, 1995; Lommerud, Straume, and Sorgard,
2005; Milliou and Pertrakis, 2007; Symeonidis, 2010). Although modeling details
are different, pre-merger setups of these previous models share a common feature;
that is, there are one-to-one relationships between upstream and downstream firms
(three pairs of upstream and downstream firms in Lommerud et al. and two pairs
in others).
When the upstream industry produces an intermediate product, each upstream
firm produces an input exclusively for one downstream producer. When the up-
stream industry produces a final product, each downstream retailer is an exclusive
distributor of one upstream firm’s product. The price of each upstream firm’s prod-
uct is determined by its bargaining with the paired downstream firm in Horn and
Wolinsky (1988), Milliou and Pertrakis (2007), and Symeonidis (2010), whereas the
price is set by each upstream firm in Ziss (1995) and Lommerud et al. (2005). An-
other common feature is that the final products are differentiated across producers
in all these models.2 Horizontal mergers in the downstream industry affect not only
downstream prices but also upstream prices. Regarding welfare consequences of hor-
izontal mergers, Ziss (1995) shows that a merger between downstream retailers can
increase output and hence pro-competitive. Also, Symeonidis (2010) shows that
a merger between downstream producers may raise consumer surplus and overall
welfare when competition is in quantity.
2The importance of countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952) has been analyzed in models that
consist of one manufacturer and a number of retailers (von Ungern-Sternberg, 1996; Dobson and
Waterson, 1997; Chen, 2003). In von Ungern-Sternberg and Dobson and Waterson, unit retail
prices are determined by manufacturer-retailer bargaining and symmetric retailers compete among
themselves. Chen took a different approach by considering a model consisting of one manufacturer,
one dominant retailer and n fringe retailers. The contract between the manufacturer and a retailer
takes the form of two-part tariffs in Chen’s model.
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Bilateral oligopoly models are applicable to real-world situations in which prod-
ucts are highly differentiated. For example, final good producers often procure a
highly specialized input for one or a few upstream suppliers, and bilateral oligopoly
models are suitable to analyze such a situation. At the same time, however, down-
stream producers often purchase relatively homogeneous inputs from a number of
upstream suppliers through markets (“market interface”) as pointed out by Inderst
(2010), and successive oligopoly models are applicable to analyze a vertical oligopoly
with market interface.
Our paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to study horizontal mergers
under a successive oligopoly model with a general demand function and to show that
horizontal mergers can improve welfare. We discover two new mechanisms, produc-
tion reallocation effect and rationalization effect, through which horizontal mergers
affect welfare. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for horizontal mergers
to improve welfare. Our model does not specify the number of upstream firms (N)
and the number of downstream firms (M). This enables us to conduct comparative
statics exercises with respect to N or M when N and M are fixed in the model, and
to endogenize N by allowing free entry in the upstream industry. Previous bilateral
oligopoly models mentioned above, in contrast, use specific functional forms and
analyze specific cases in which N (= M) is small (2 or 3).
The downstream firms produce a homogeneous product in our model, which is
an appropriate assumption under successive oligopoly models. This assumption en-
ables clean comparison between our results and previous findings in the horizontal
merger literature without vertical relationships, because firms produce a homoge-
neous product in most of these previous models.3 In contrast, aforementioned bi-
lateral oligopoly models assume that downstream firms produce differentiated prod-
ucts. This is a reasonable assumption because highly specialized inputs supplied
under one-to-one relationships typically lead to differentiated final products. In-
troducing product differentiation in our model would not change the qualitative
nature of our results. Production reallocation effect and rationalization effect, the
two key channels of welfare improvement, do not depend on whether products are
homogenous or differentiated.
3This is true in Salant et al. (1983), Perry and Porter (1985), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), and
McAfee and Williams (1992), whereas Deneckere and Davidson (1985) consider a differentiated
oligopoly.
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3 Successive oligopoly with asymmetric firms
We consider an industry with two sectors of production, upstream and downstream.
In the upstream sector, a homogeneous intermediate product is produced by N up-
stream firms. Each upstream firm, k(= 1, 2, .., N), produces at constant marginal
cost ck. Without loss of generality, assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cN where at least one
inequality is strict. In the downstream sector, the intermediate products are trans-
formed into homogeneous final product with constant marginal cost, which is nor-
malized to zero. Production of one unit of the final product requires one unit of the
intermediate product. Initially, there are M > 1 downstream firms. A downstream
merger is simply modeled as a reduction in M . Following Farrell and Shapiro (1990)
we focus on welfare effect of mergers, implicitly assuming that mergers, if proposed,
are profitable. The downstream firms face a thrice continuously differentiable and
strictly decreasing inverse demand function P (Q), where Q ≥ 0 denotes the aggre-
gate output in the downstream sector. To ensure that a positive but finite quantity
is produced in equilibrium, we assume P0 ≡ lim
Q→0
P (Q) > max
k∈N
ck > lim
Q→∞
P (Q) ≡ P∞.
The firms produce and compete in two stages. In Stage 1, the upstream firms
compete in quantity (Cournot) in supplying intermediate goods. In Stage 2, the
downstream firms also compete in quantity to supply final products. The input
price r is determined at the market-clearing level, which equates the demand of
downstream firms to the total amount of the intermediate product supplied by the
upstream firms. Note that the downstream firms have no oligopsony power over the
upstream sector. This assumption is in line with the previous literature on vertical
oligopolies—see, for example, Greenhut and Ohta (1979), Salinger (1988), Ghosh
and Morita (2007), and Peitz and Reisinger (2013)—where downstream firms take
the input price as given when they make a production decision.4
We consider the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies of
the game. As is well known, the following assumption guarantees the existence and
uniqueness of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the downstream competition (see,
for instance, Vives, 2001).
Assumption 1 (M + 1)P ′(Q) +QP ′′(Q) < 0 for all Q > 0 and M ≥ 1.
4The downstream firms’ price-taking behavior can be rationalized by assuming that the up-
stream sector supplies to a large number of downstream sectors. Then, even if some downstream
sectors have only a few firms with significant market power, the total number of downstream firms
is still large, and hence a quantity change of each downstream firm has a negligible effect on input
price. See Reisinger and Schnitzer (2012) for an alternative modeling with differentiated products
in which both upstream and downstream markets are modeled as Salop-circles.
7
The game is solved by using backward induction. In Stage 2, each downstream
firm i(= 1, 2, ...,M) chooses its output, qi(≥ 0), to maximize its profit:
(P (qi +
M∑
j 6=i
qj)− r)qi,
taking other downstream firms’ output and input price as given. Under Assumption
1, there exists a unique interior solution to this maximization problem that solves
the first-order condition:
P (qi +
M∑
j 6=i
qj)− r + P ′(qi +
M∑
j 6=i
qj)qi = 0, (1)
where i = 1, 2, ...,M . If r ∈ (0, P0), equation (1) yields the sole candidate for the
sub-game equilibrium in Stage 2, q1 = q2 = ... = qM ≡ q. If r ∈ [P0,∞), each firm
i’s equilibrium decision is to choose qi = 0. Assume r ∈ (0, P0). Adding together
the first-order conditions for i = 1, 2, ...,M and rearranging yields:
r = P (Mq) +
P ′(Mq)Mq
M
. (2)
This condition implicitly defines q as a function of r. Then, the total output can be
written as Q(r) = Mq for r ∈ (0, P0).
We next consider the Stage 1 game in which N upstream firms compete in
supplying inputs. Let xk denote the output of an upstream firm k(= 1, 2, ..., N) and
let X =
N∑
k
xk. The one-to-one transformation between inputs and final products
implies X = Mq. Thus, equation (2) becomes:
r = P (X) +
P ′(X)X
M
≡ g(X,M).
The inverse demand faced by upstream firms is then equal to P0 if X = 0, g(X,M)
if X ∈ (0, Q0), and 0 if X ≥ Q0 ≡ lim
r→0
Q(r). It is easy to verify that gX(X,M) =
∂g(X,M)
∂X
< 0 for any X > 0.
Given the upstream inverse demand function, an upstream firm k’s profit is:(
g(xk +
N∑
l 6=k
xl,M)− ck
)
xk.
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Each upstream firm k chooses its output, xk, to maximize its profit, taking other
upstream firms’ outputs as given. The next assumption, which is the counterpart of
Assumption 1 in the upstream sector, ensures the existence and uniqueness of the
solution to the upstream firms’ profit-maximization problem.
Assumption 2 (N + 1)gX(X,M) + XgXX(X,M) < 0 for all X > 0, M ≥ 1, and
N ≥ 1.
Solving the first-order conditions:
g
(
xk +
N∑
l 6=k
xl,M
)
− ck + gX
(
xk +
N∑
l 6=k
xl,M
)
xk = 0,
yields:
x∗k = −
g(X∗,M)− ck
gX(X∗,M)X∗
, (3)
where X∗ satisfies the following condition:
Ng(X∗,M)−
N∑
k=1
ck + gX(X
∗,M)X∗ = 0. (4)
Here is the summary description of the equilibrium outcomes. In equilibrium,
X∗, given by (4), is the aggregate amount of the intermediate input produced in
the upstream sector. An upstream firm k (= 1, 2, ..., N) produces x∗k units of the
intermediate input, where x∗k satisfies (3). Given the one-to-one relationship between
the intermediate input and the final good, the aggregate amount of the final good
produced in equilibrium is Q∗ = X∗. Each downstream firm produces q∗ = Q
∗
M
= X
∗
M
units of the final good. The prices of the final good and the intermediate input are
given by P ∗ ≡ P (X∗) and r∗ ≡ g(X∗,M) respectively.
Intermediate inputs, and consequently the input price, are usually absent in the
standard analyses of horizontal mergers. Almost exclusively, these analyses focus on
single-stage oligopolies producing final goods. We depart from the standard practice
by explicitly incorporating an imperfectly competitive upstream sector and allowing
for endogenous determination of the input price, r∗. A key component of our welfare
results is the reallocation of output shares among the upstream firms following a
merger-induced change in r∗.
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Input Price: To understand how downstream mergers affect r∗, rewrite (4) as:
r∗
(
1− 1
Ne∗u
)
=
N∑
k=1
ck
N
, (5)
where r∗ = g(X∗,M) is the equilibrium input price and e∗u = − r
∗
X∗gX(X∗,M)
is the
elasticity of the input demand function evaluated at (r∗, X∗). Equation (5) cap-
tures the familiar negative relationship between price and elasticity: the higher the
elasticity of input demand, the lower the input price.
The elasticity term eu involves the first-order derivative of g(.), or, equivalently,
the second-order derivative of P (.). Consequently, a change in eu involves the second-
order derivative of g(.), or, equivalently, the third-order derivative, P ′′′. To cut
through the complication arising from higher order derivatives, we define two notions
related to the slopes of the demand functions. Let
d =
QP ′′(Q)
P ′(Q)
denote the elasticity of slope of the inverse demand function, P (Q). Similarly, let
u =
XgXX(X,M)
gX(X,M)
denote the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand faced by the upstream firms,
g(X,M). Proposition 1 expresses the necessary and sufficient condition for the
reduction in r∗ in terms of the elasticity of slopes defined above.
Proposition 1 A downstream merger reduces (increases) the input price if and only
if:
u − d > (<)0 (6)
or, equivalently, dd
dQ
> (<) 0 where u and d are evaluated at X = X
∗.
The condition given in Proposition 1 is general, convenient to check, and depends
solely on a property of the demand function: whether d increases, decreases, or
remains unchanged with a change in Q. For an illustrative example, consider the
inverse demand function given by:
P (Q) = (1−Q)b,
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where b > 0. We have that:
d =
QP ′′(Q)
P ′(Q)
= (1− b) Q
1−Q.
The demand function is linear when b = 1. In this case, d(= 0) is constant and
hence, according to Proposition 1, the input price does not change with a merger in
the downstream sector. However, when b < (>)1, d is increasing (decreasing) in Q
implying that a merger leads to a lower (higher) input price.
While the demand functions used in imperfect competition models allow some
flexibility in the elasticity of demand, few are flexible in the curvature properties of
demand. Fabinger and Weyl (2012) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) argue that while
they buy convenience, unnecessarily restrictive assumptions on curvature might lead
to biased conclusions.5 They show that demand curvature plays a central role in
determining the rate of cost-pass through in models of imperfect competition. In the
context of price discrimination, Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2011) show that the
differences in the curvature of demand between the weak and the strong markets is
important for understanding how third-degree price discrimination affects welfare.
Cowan (2007) illustrates the role of demand curvature in the context of third-degree
price discrimination where the demand function in the weak and the strong markets
differ by an additive scalar.6
Our finding is in a similar spirit in the sense that the curvature properties of up-
stream and downstream demand are crucial in understanding the effect of a down-
stream merger on the input price. It is tempting to focus on a class of demand func-
tions with a particular curvature property, say, constant elasticity of slope. This is
convenient, easily tractable, and the class includes popular demand functions such
as linear, semi-log, and constant elasticity. However, the input price does not vary
with downstream mergers for this class of demand functions. The invariance goes
away once we allow for more general demand functions, in particular the ones with
decreasing and increasing elasticities of slope.7
The input price can go down with a downstream merger. It is then important to
5For example, if demand functions are assumed to be logconcave, equilibrium price can never
increase more than the rise in cost in a standard monopoly setup.
6When third-degree price discrimination is applied to two markets, a weak (strong) market is
referred to the market in which the discriminatory price is below (above) the non-discriminatory
one.
7If upstream firms have increasing marginal costs then the input price can go down even for
the class of demand functions with constant elasticities of slope. Consider the class of demand
functions with constant elasticities of slope where u = d =  (say). Instead of ckxk, suppose
an upstream firm k’s cost function is give by ckxk +
dx2k
2 where d > 0. We find that
dr∗
dM =
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investigate whether or not the reduced input price offsets the anti-competitive effect
of higher market concentration caused by the downstream merger. We find that
downstream mergers increase welfare under a range of parameterizations, whereas
they decrease consumer surplus, despite lower input prices, as long as Assumptions
1 and 2 are satisfied.
Consumer Surplus: Consumers buy Q∗ units of the final good in equilibrium.
Since one unit of the final good requires one unit of the intermediate input, Q∗ = X∗,
and consumer surplus could be expressed as:
CS =
∫ X∗
0
P (y)dy − P (X∗)X∗,
where X∗ is given implicitly by (4). Differentiating (4) and rearranging, we get
dX∗
dM
=
X∗(N + 1 + d)
M(M + 1 + d)(N + 1 + u)
. (7)
Analyzing the right-hand side of (7) and noting that a reduction in X∗ is necessary
and sufficient for a reduction in CS in an oligopoly with a homogenous final good,
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 For all demand functions satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, a hori-
zontal merger in the downstream sector always reduces consumer surplus (CS).
To understand Proposition 2, rewrite (4) in terms of prices and elasticities:
P ∗ =
r∗
1− 1
Med
,
where ed = − PQP ′(Q) is the elasticity of demand for the final good evaluated at Q =
Q∗ = X∗ and P = P ∗ = P (X∗). The final good’s price, P ∗, is the input price, r∗,
times the mark-up 1
1−1/Med . Mergers increase the market power of the downstream
firms and raise the mark-up. This puts an upward pressure on P ∗. However, for
demand functions satisfying dd
dQ
> 0, the input price r∗ goes down with merger
which puts downward pressure on P ∗. Assumption 1, which is effectively d > −2,
puts an implicit upper bound on the degree of convexity of demand functions, which
in turn limits the downward pressure on P ∗. We find that the downward pressure
on P ∗ caused by a reduction in r∗ is always outweighed by the upward pressure on
dX∗
M((M+1+)(N+1+)− Md
P ′(X∗) )
> 0.
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P ∗ caused by higher mark-up. Thus, for the class of demand functions satisfying
Assumptions 1 and 2, price never decreases or equivalently consumer surplus never
increases following a merger.8
Welfare: In our successive oligopoly framework with asymmetric upstream firms,
welfare is given by:
W =
∫ X∗
0
P (y)dy −
M∑
k=1
ckx
∗
k, (8)
where
∫ X∗
0
P (y)dy is the gross surplus and
M∑
k=1
ckx
∗
k is the aggregate production costs.
Define s∗k ≡ x
∗
k
X∗ as the output share of the k-th upstream firm and express (8) as:
W =
∫ X∗
0
P (y)dy − (
M∑
k=1
cks
∗
k)X
∗. (9)
where
M∑
k=1
cks
∗
k is the average cost in the upstream industry of producing X
∗. Dif-
ferentiating (9) with respect to M we have that:
dW
dM
=
(
P ∗ −
M∑
k=1
cks
∗
k
)
dX∗
dM
−X∗ d
dM
(
M∑
k
cks
∗
k
)
.
While dX
∗
dM
> 0, dW
dM
< 0 can still hold if d
dM
(
M∑
k
cks
∗
k) > 0. Even if aggregate output
decreases, welfare can still increase with a merger if production efficiency improves,
i.e., average production cost,
M∑
k
cks
∗
k, decreases.
Let si =
x∗i
X∗ and sj =
x∗j
X∗ denote the share of total intermediate input produced
by firms i and j respectively, where ci < cj. Using (3), we can express:
s∗i
s∗j
=
r∗ − ci
r∗ − cj = 1 +
cj − ci
r∗ − cj .
We interpret that (r∗ − ci)/(r∗ − cj) captures the cost-efficient firm i’s competitive
advantage over firm j in terms of price-cost margin. Then, firm i’s competitive
8Consumer surplus can improve with a merger if we relax Assumptions 1 and 2, which are
typically used as sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium. As-
sumptions 1 and 2 respectively imply d > −2 and u > −2. We found the possibility of consumer
surplus improvement with the following parameterization: N = 1, M > 3, P (Q) = a + Q−b with
b > 1. Here, both Assumptions 1 and 2 are violated since u = d = −(b+ 1) < −2.
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advantage increases as r∗ decreases. This implies that the market shares in the up-
stream sector shift towards more efficient upstream firms if and only if r∗ decreases.
We call this effect as the production reallocation effect of an input-price reduction.
The relationship between a reduction in r∗ and increased dispersion of upstream
market shares is best reflected in the Herfindahl Index (H) of the upstream sector
given by:
H =
N∑
k=1
(s∗k)
2 =
N∑
k=1
(
x∗k
X∗
)2 =
∑N
k=1(r
∗ − ck)2
N2(r∗ − µ)2 =
1
N
+
σ2
N(r∗ − µ)2 ,
where µ =
∑N
k=1 ck
N
and σ2 =
∑N
k=1(ck−µ)2
N
denote the mean and the variance respec-
tively of the unit costs c1, c2, ..., ck. Observe that H increases as r
∗ decreases. By
increasing the market shares of the relatively more efficient firms, a decrease in r∗
lowers average production costs
M∑
k=1
cks
∗
k.
The above discussion suggests that a reduction in r∗, or, equivalently:
u − d > 0,
is a necessary condition for welfare improvement. The necessary condition can be
made tighter by considering a slightly different decomposition of dW
dM
:
dW
dM
=
N∑
k=1
(P ∗ − ck)dx
∗
k
dM
. (10)
Even though
∑N
k=1
dx∗k
dM
= dX
∗
dM
> 0 (by Proposition 2), dW
dM
< 0 implies that
dxk
dM
< 0 must hold for some k. At least one upstream firm’s output must increase
for welfare to improve with downstream mergers. Recall that, N upstream firms are
labeled such that ck < ck+1 where k = {1, 2, ..., N − 1}. We have that:
dW
dM
< 0⇒ dr
∗
dM
> 0⇒
d
s∗k
s∗k+1
dM
< 0,
which implies that if x∗k increases for a set of upstream firms, that set must include
the most efficient firm (k = 1). We have that:
dx∗k
dM
=
X∗((Ns∗k − 1)(u − d)− s∗k(N + 1 + d))
M(M + 1 + d)(N + 1 + u)
, (11)
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which is strictly negative for k = 1 if and only if the following holds:
u − d > 1 +
( 1
s∗1
+ 1 + d)
N − 1
s∗1
. (12)
Since firm 1 is the most efficient one among N firms and there are at least two
active firms, 1
N
< s∗1 < 1, which in turn implies that (a) N − 1s∗1 > 0 and (b)
1
s∗1
+ 1 + d > 2 + d > 0. Thus, the right-hand side of (12) is greater than unity.
Starting from parameterizations that satisfy u − d > 0, we have narrowed down
our search for welfare-improving mergers to a subset of those parameterizations,
namely, the ones that satisfy:
u − d > 1. (13)
While stronger than u− d > 0, (13) is still not sufficient for dWdM < 0. Substitut-
ing the expressions of
dx∗k
dM
from (11) in (10) and analyzing the resultant expression
gives us the necessary and sufficient condition for welfare-improving mergers in terms
of market structure, the demand curvatures, and concentration in the upstream sec-
tor captured by the Herfindahl Index.
Proposition 3 When the upstream firms have asymmetric unit costs, a downstream
merger improves welfare if and only if the following condition holds:
u − d > 1 +
1
H
(1 + N+1+d
M+1+d
) + 1 + d
N − 1
H
, (14)
where H =
N∑
k=1
(s∗k)
2 is the Herfindahl Index corresponding to the upstream sector.
Observe that the right-hand side of (14) is strictly decreasing in H. Loosely
speaking, this implies that the higher concentration in the upstream sector makes
it more likely that a downstream merger increases welfare. The statement is loose
in the sense that u, d, and H often changes simultaneously (due to change in
parameter values) which makes it difficult to isolate the impact of a change in H.
In the case of mean-preserving spread of unit costs, however, only H increases
while u and d remain unchanged. This is immediate from rearranging (4), which
gives:
X∗ = −N(g(X
∗,M)− µ)
gX(X∗,M)
,
and Herfindahl Index:
H =
1
N
+
σ2
N(r∗ − µ)2 .
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Keeping µ the same, suppose we increase σ. As long as µ remains the same, X∗
does not change. Since u and d depend on X
∗ only, they do not change either. As
σ increases, H increases as well.
Thus, conditional on u − d > 1 being satisfied, a mean-preserving spread of
unit costs raises H, which increases the right-hand side of (14) and makes welfare
improvement more likely. A reduction in the input price increases cost-efficient
firms’ competitive advantages over cost-inefficient firms, and increases market shares
of cost-efficient firms. Under a mean-preserving spread of unit costs, an input-
price reduction more drastically increases cost-efficient firms’ competitive advantages
and their market shares, making it more likely for downstream mergers to improve
welfare by reducing input price.
We conclude this section with a concrete example of welfare improving mergers.
Example 1 The inverse demand function is P (Q) = (1−Q)b with b > 0 (Malueg,
1992). This demand function is convex for b > 1, linear for b = 1, and concave
for 0 < b < 1. Let N = 6, b = 0.05, c1 = 0.1, and ck = 0.8 for k 6= 1. The table
below presents the equilibrium values of individual output, x1 and xk for k 6= 1, total
output, X∗, input price, r∗, Herfindahl index, H∗, and welfare, W ∗.
M d u x
∗
1 x
∗
k X
∗ r∗ H∗ W ∗
4 6.380 10.71 0.734 0.0273 0.870 0.827 0.716 0.658
3 5.481 9.394 0.742 0.022 0.852 0.821 0.762 0.662
2 4.357 7.666 0.755 0.013 0.821 0.812 0.848 0.668
Clearly, following downstream mergers, the production shifts to firm 1, the input
price decreases, and welfare increases.
4 Free entry in the upstream sector
We have shown that downstream mergers can improve welfare when upstream firms
have asymmetric costs. Key to the possibility of welfare improvement is reallocation
in the upstream sector: downstream mergers can lower the input price, which in turn
reallocates upstream production towards more efficient upstream firms and improves
welfare. In this section, we focus on an alternative channel of welfare improvement,
namely rationalization of the upstream sector. A downstream merger can lower the
input price, which in turn leads to fewer but bigger upstream firms. In the presence
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of fixed costs, bigger firms imply lower average costs, which in turn creates the
possibility of welfare improvement. Although the two channels, i.e., rationalization
and reallocation, work differently, the necessary condition for welfare improvement
is the same for both: a reduction in the input price.
As before, assume that there are M(≥ 1) downstream firms producing a homoge-
nous final good facing inverse demand P (Q). The demand specification as well as
the downstream production remain the same as in Section 3. Modeling changes are
only in the upstream sector. Assume that a large number of identical upstream firms
exist, each of which must decide whether to enter the upstream sector by incurring a
setup cost of K > 0. Each upstream firm has a constant marginal production cost,
c > 0. Notice that in order to focus on the rationalization effect of downstream
mergers, we rule out the reallocation effect by assuming that all upstream entrants
have the same constant marginal cost. There is free entry in the upstream sector
and entry is assumed to take place after a downstream merger (if any) so the number
of active upstream firms can differ depending on whether the merger takes place at
a prior stage.9
Let Nˆ and Xˆ respectively denote the number of upstream firms and aggregate
output in the free-entry equilibrium. Upon entry, each upstream firm produces
Xˆ
Nˆ
≡ xˆ. Free entry in the upstream sector implies that the post-entry profit of each
upstream firm exactly offsets the fixed cost of entry, where we ignore the integer
constraint, as is standard in the literature. Thus:
(g(Xˆ,M)− c)Xˆ
Nˆ
= K. (15)
Summing up the first-order conditions of the upstream firms’ profit-maximization
problem, we get:
Nˆg(Xˆ,M)− Nˆc+ XˆgX(Xˆ,M) = 0. (16)
9Alternatively, we could assume that each upstream firm’s cost function C(xi) = cxi + K if
xi > 0 and zero otherwise, in which case even if the entry cost is zero, the number of active
upstream firms would differ depending on the merger decision. We assume K to be suitably low
such that at least one upstream firm enters and produces a strictly positive amount of output.
Furthermore, following the standard practice in this literature, we treat the number of upstream
firms, N , as a continuous variable.
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Differentiating equations (15) and (16) and rearranging, we find that:
dNˆ
dM
=
(
Nˆ
M
)(
1
2Nˆ + u
)[
Nˆ + 1 + d + Nˆ(u − d)
M + 1 + d
]
, (17)
dXˆ
dM
=
∂Xˆ
∂M
+
∂Xˆ
∂Nˆ
dNˆ
dM
=
Xˆ(2Nˆ + 1 + d)
M(2N + u)(M + 1 + d)
. (18)
Analyzing (17) and (18) gives the following result:
Proposition 4 For all demand functions satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, a down-
stream merger reduces aggregate output (Qˆ) and consumer surplus (CS).
From Section 3, we know that, when the number of upstream firms is fixed,
downstream merger reduces output. Proposition 4 tells us that the qualitative
nature of the result remains unchanged under free entry of upstream firms.
While consumer surplus decreases, welfare might improve with a downstream
merger if production efficiency improves, or, equivalently, if the average cost goes
down. In the presence of free entry in the upstream sector, we can write welfare
(W ) as the gross benefit less the sum of production costs and entry costs:
W =
∫ Xˆ
0
P (y)dy − cXˆ − NˆK
=
∫ Xˆ
0
P (y)dy − Xˆ
(
c+
K
xˆ
)
=
∫ Xˆ
0
P (y)dy − rˆXˆ. (19)
The second equality restates welfare by expressing costs as output, Xˆ, times average
cost, cXˆ+NˆK
Xˆ
(= c + K
xˆ
). The third equality follows from rearranging the zero-profit
condition in the upstream sector, (rˆ − c)xˆ − K = 0, as rˆ = cK
xˆ
, i.e., average cost
must equal the input price in the free-entry equilibrium. It is then immediate that,
with a downstream merger, the average cost goes down if and only the input price
goes down.
Differentiating (19) with respect to M gives:
dW
dM
= (Pˆ − rˆ)
(
dXˆ
dM
)
− Xˆ drˆ
dM
.
Since dXˆ
dM
< 0, dW
dM
< 0 can hold only if drˆ
dM
> 0. Thus, as in Section 3, a neces-
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sary condition for welfare improvement is that the input price goes down with a
downstream merger. In the Appendix we show that:
drˆ
dM
=
−P ′(Xˆ)Xˆ(u − d − 1)
M2(2Nˆ + u)
.
Since P ′(Xˆ) < 0 and 2Nˆ + u > 0 (by Assumption 2), we have the following result.
Proposition 5 In the presence of free entry in the upstream sector, a downstream
merger reduces (increases) the input price if and only if:
u − d > (<)1, (20)
where u and d are evaluated at (X,N) = (Xˆ, Nˆ).
Observe that (20) is stronger than (6)—the condition for input price reduction
in Section 3. In other words, a reduction in input price is less likely under free
entry. The curvature-related arguments outlined in Section 3 apply here as well.
Under free entry, there is an additional effect on the input price arising from the
change in upstream market structure. A downstream merger typically leads to fewer
upstream firms, which in turn puts an upward pressure on the input price. As a
result, a reduction in input price becomes less likely under free entry. While a
reduction in rˆ is necessary for welfare improvement, it is not sufficient. Proposition
6 below states the necessary and sufficient condition for welfare improvement.
Proposition 6 In the presence of free entry in the downstream sector, downstream
mergers improve welfare if and only if:
u − d > 1 + 2N + 1 + d
M + 2 + d
, (21)
where both u and d are evaluated at (X,N) = (Xˆ, Nˆ).
The right-hand side of (21) is strictly greater than unity since 2N + 1 + d > 0
and M+2+d > 0. Recall that u−d−1 > 0 is required for a reduction in r∗, which
in turn prompts a reduction in average costs. For welfare gains from lower average
costs to outweigh the welfare loss from lower aggregate output, a more stringent
condition is needed, namely, u − d − 1 needs to be greater than a strictly positive
threshold. Below, we present a concrete example where (21) is satisfied.
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Example 2 Consider again the inverse demand function P (Q) = (1−Q)b and the
following parameterization: M = 5, c = 0.01, k = 0.3, and b = 0.1. The table below
suggests that a horizontal merger among downstream firms can lead to lower total
output, lower input price, and fewer upstream firms, but higher welfare.
M Qˆ u d rˆ Nˆ Wˆ
5 0.874 13.22 6.260 0.700 2.010 0.205
4 0.861 11.76 5.569 0.6942 1.963 0.208
3 0.841 10.02 4.748 0.686 1.894 0.212
2 0.805 7.863 3.724 0.673 1.781 0.217
In our successive oligopoly framework with upstream free entry, a downstream
merger improves welfare only if the input price rˆ, or, equivalently, the average cost,
c+ K
(Xˆ/Nˆ)
, goes down. A downstream merger decreases aggregate output Xˆ. Then,
average cost decreases if and only if the equilibrium number of upstream firms Nˆ
decreases as well. How can a reduction in Nˆ improve welfare? It is possible if the
number of upstream firms is socially excessive. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and
Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) show that the free-entry number of firms in a ho-
mogenous products Cournot oligopoly is socially excessive.10 In a vertical oligopoly
framework such as ours, the free-entry number of upstream firms can be socially
insufficient or excessive (see, for example, Ghosh and Morita, 2007). Excessive en-
try is necessary for welfare improvement of downstream mergers in our framework.
We find that downstream mergers can help mitigate excessive entry in the upstream
sector when they reduce the input price (r) and lower the upstream average cost
c + K
(Xˆ/Nˆ)
. For a range of parameterizations, we find that the welfare gain from
reduction in the upstream average cost outweighs the welfare loss from the standard
anticompetitive effect of a merger.
5 Upstream mergers
Thus far, we have focused on welfare implications of downstream mergers. In this
section, we study welfare implications of upstream mergers. Overall, our findings in
this section are parallel to our finding in the previous two sections. In the presence of
cost asymmetry in the downstream sector, an upstream merger can improve welfare
10Mankiw and Whinston (1986) have shown that, if an entrant causes incumbent firms to reduce
output, entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is to society. There is therefore a tendency
toward excessive entry in homogeneous product markets.
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by reallocating output towards more efficient downstream firms. Under free entry
in the downstream sector, an upstream merger can improve welfare by rationalizing
the downstream sector. As in Sections 3 and 4, reallocation and rationalization
respectively are key mechanisms underpinning welfare improvement. We find that
upstream mergers increase the input price r as well as the final good’s price P .
However, P − r can increase or decrease. A reduction in P − r is necessary for
an upstream merger to improve welfare in both cases. Lower P − r, i.e., a smaller
price-cost margin in the downstream sector, increases the output shares of relatively
efficient downstream firms, which improves production efficiency. When there is free
entry, a squeeze in the price-cost margin leads to fewer but bigger downstream firms
generating welfare gains from scale economies. We keep the discussion brief, as
several steps in the analyses are quite similar to those in Sections 3 and 4.
5.1 Asymmetric downstream firms
Consider the model in Section 3 with the following variation. All upstream firms
have the same constant marginal cost c > 0. Each downstream firm requires one
unit of the intermediate input (r denotes the input price) to produce one unit of the
final good. In addition, downstream firm i incurs the per-unit cost ai to transform
one unit of the intermediate input to one unit of the final good.11 Assume ai ≤ ai+1,
where the strict inequality holds for some i ≤M − 1. Downstream firm i’s constant
marginal cost of production is then r + ai. Proceeding as in Section 3, it can be
shown that the input demand function faced by each upstream firm is:
r = P (X)− µa + XP
′(X)
M
≡ g(X,M),
where µa =
M∑
k=1
ak
M
. In the overall equilibrium of the successive oligopoly game, each
upstream firm produces x∗ = −g(X∗,M)−c
gX(X∗,M)
, where X∗ satisfies:
Ng(X∗,M)−Nc+X∗gX(X∗,M) = 0.
It is straightforward to show that:
dX∗
dN
=
X∗
N(N + 1 + u)
> 0. (22)
11In Section 3, the cost of transformation was normalized to zero; i.e., ai = 0 for all i.
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Since X∗ decreases with a merger, consumer surplus always decreases with an up-
stream merger. However, as in Section 3, welfare can still increase if production
efficiency improves.
Welfare is given by the gross surplus less aggregate production costs:
W =
X∗∫
0
P (y)dy − cX∗ − (
M∑
k=1
aks
∗
k)X
∗,
where s∗k =
q∗k
Q∗ is the share of the final good produced by a downstream firm k and
M∑
k=1
s∗k = 1. Differentiating W with respect to N we get:
dW
dN
= (P ∗ − c)dX
∗
dN
−X∗ d
dN
(
M∑
k=1
aksk
)
,
where P ∗ ≡ P (X∗) denotes the equilibrium price of the final good.
Let s∗i and s
∗
j denote the share of the final good produced by firms i and j
respectively, where ai < aj. The ratio of market shares is given by:
s∗i
s∗j
=
P ∗ − r∗ − ai
P ∗ − r∗ − aj = 1 +
aj − ai
P ∗ − r∗ − aj ,
where r∗ ≡ g(X∗,M) denotes the equilibrium price of the input. The cost-efficient
firm i’s competitive advantage over firm j in terms of the price-cost margin, (P ∗ −
r∗− ai)/(P ∗− r∗− aj), increases as P ∗− r∗ decreases. This implies that the market
shares in the downstream sector shift towards more efficient firms if and only if
P ∗ − r∗ decreases. We have that:
dP ∗
dN
= P ′(X∗)
dX∗
dN
=
X∗P ′(X∗)
N(N + 1 + u)
< 0,
dr∗
dN
= gX(X
∗,M)
dX∗
dN
=
X∗P ′(X∗)(1 + 1+d
M
)
N(N + 1 + u)
< 0
and thus:
d(P ∗ − r∗)
dN
> 0⇔ X
∗P ′(X∗)(1 + d)
MN(N + 1 + u)
< 0⇔ d > −1.
That is, an upstream merger decreases P ∗ − r∗ if and only if d > −1.
An upstream merger increases the input price r∗ and P ∗. If d > −1, i.e., the
inverse demand function is strictly logconcave, P ∗ does not increase as much as r∗
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and hence P ∗− r∗ decreases. Since aj−ai > 0, a decrease in P ∗− r∗ leads to higher
s∗i
s∗j
. As the market shares of relatively more efficient firms increases,
M∑
k
aks
∗
k declines
and production efficiency improves. Thus, upstream mergers improve production
efficiency in the downstream sector if and only if the inverse demand function is
strictly logconcave. However, strict logconcavity of the inverse demand function is
not sufficient to guarantee welfare improvement.
Proposition 7 When the downstream firms have asymmetric marginal costs of pro-
duction, an upstream merger improves welfare if and only the following condition
holds:
d(Hd − 1
M
) >
M +N + 1 + d
MN
, (23)
where Hd =
N∑
k=1
(sk)
2 is the Herfindahl index for the downstream sector.
Since M +N + 1 + d > 0 (by Assumptions 1 and 2) and Hd− 1M > 0, (23) holds
only if the demand function is strictly concave (i.e., d > 0). Conditional on the strict
concavity condition being satisfied, a higher degree of asymmetry makes welfare
improvement more likely. To see why, express Herfindahl Index of the downstream
sector as:
Hd =
1
N
+
σ2a
N(P ∗ − r∗ − µa)2 ,
where µa =
M∑
k=1
ak
M
and σ2 =
∑M
k=1(ak−µa)2
N
denote the mean and the variance of the
unit costs a1, a2, ..., ak. Keeping µa the same, suppose we increase the degree of
downstream cost asymmetry by increasing σa. As long as µa remains the same, the
input demand function g(X,M) = P (X) − µa + XP ′(X)M does not change. Conse-
quently, X∗, and d, which only depends on X∗, remain unchanged. As σa increases,
only Hd increases which makes (23) more likely to hold.
12,13
12Notice that (i) strict concavity of the inverse demand function (i.e., d > 0) is necessary for
welfare improvement, and (ii) welfare improvement can occur for demand functions even with a
constant elasticity of slope. Neither (i) nor (ii) were true for downstream mergers.
13It is easy to construct examples of welfare improving upstream mergers. Rearrange (23) as
follows d(Hd − 1M − 1MN ) > 1M + 1N + 1MN . Consider a demand function of the form P = 1−Qb
where the constant elasticity of slope is d = u = b − 1. Fix M > 2 and N > 2. It is always
possible to choose b and degree of cost asymmetry high enough such that (23) holds.
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5.2 Free entry in the downstream sector
Consider once again the setup described above. Impose symmetry in the downstream
sector, i.e., ai = a for all i = 1, 2, , ,M , which implies that the input demand function
faced by each upstream firm is:
r = P (X)− a+ XP
′(X)
M
≡ g(X,M).
The number of downstream firms, M , is determined endogenously as there is
free entry in the downstream sector. Let Mˆ and Qˆ respectively denote the num-
ber of downstream firms and aggregate output in equilibrium. Upon entry, each
downstream firm produces qˆ = Qˆ
Mˆ
. Free entry in the downstream sector implies that
the post-entry profit of each downstream firm exactly offsets the fixed cost of entry.
Ignoring the integer constraint, we can write the free entry condition as:
(Pˆ − a− rˆ)Qˆ
Mˆ
= K,
where Pˆ and rˆ denote the prices of the final good and the intermediate input re-
spectively. Using Qˆ = Xˆ and rˆ = g(Xˆ, Mˆ) = Pˆ − a+ XˆP ′(Xˆ)
Mˆ
in the above equation,
we can rewrite the free-entry condition as:
− Pˆ
′(Xˆ)Xˆ2
Mˆ2
= K. (24)
Equation (24) together with the sum of the first-order conditions (in the upstream
sector), i.e.,
Ng(Xˆ, Mˆ) + XˆgX(Xˆ, Mˆ) = Nc, (25)
determines Xˆ and Mˆ .
Hereafter, we focus on parameterizations for which upstream mergers lead to
rationalization of the downstream sector (i.e., a reduction in Mˆ). These parameter-
izations include linear demand, constant elasticity demand and in fact all demand
functions with weakly increasing elasticity of slope (dd
dQ
≥ 0). For all such param-
eterizations, aggregate outputs and consumer surplus decrease with an upstream
merger. However, welfare can still increase with an upstream merger.
Welfare in this case is defined as the gross benefit less production costs and entry
costs:
W =
∫ Xˆ
0
P (y)dy − (a+ c)Xˆ − MˆK.
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Since downstream profits are zero, i.e., Pˆ Xˆ − (a+ rˆ)Xˆ − MˆK = 0, welfare could be
expressed as:
W =
∫ Xˆ
0
P (y)dy − Pˆ Xˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer surplus
+ (rˆ − c)Xˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
upstream profits
,
which upon differentiation gives:
dW
dN
= (rˆ − c)dXˆ
dN
− Xˆ d(Pˆ − rˆ)
dN
.
Even if dXˆ
dN
> 0, dW
dN
< 0 can hold if d(Pˆ−rˆ)
dN
> 0. In the Appendix, we show that:
d(Pˆ − rˆ)
dN
= −dP
′(Xˆ)
2M
dXˆ
dN
. (26)
Using (26), we can express dW
dN
as:
dW
dN
=
XˆP ′(Xˆ)(N − 2)
2MˆN
(
d − 2(Mˆ + 1)
N − 2
)
dXˆ
dN
. (27)
The welfare result stated below follows from analyzing (27).
Proposition 8 In the presence of free entry in the downstream sector, an upstream
merger improves welfare if and only if:
d >
2(Mˆ + 1)
N − 2 , (28)
where d is evaluated at (X,M) = (Xˆ, Mˆ).
To better understand the welfare result, rearrange the zero-profit condition in
the downstream sector as:
Pˆ − rˆ = a+ K
qˆ
.
If dXˆ
dN
> 0 and d > 0, Pˆ − rˆ decreases with an upstream merger (see equation (26))
and qˆ increases. Thus, if demand function is strictly concave, downstream firms
that are active after the merger enjoy greater economies of scale. Welfare gains
from greater economies of scale offset welfare loss from lower aggregate outputs
when demand function is sufficiently concave, in particular when d >
2(Mˆ+1)
N−2 .
14
14It is easy to construct examples where (28) holds. Consider the inverse demand function
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6 Summary and conclusion
Final-goods producers often procure intermediate products from upstream firms
and sell their products through downstream retailers. It is therefore important to
study welfare effects of horizontal mergers under models that incorporate vertical
relationships between industries. It is well known that horizontal mergers under
Cournot oligopoly models (without vertical relationships) can improve welfare in the
presence of production reshuﬄing and synergy or learning associated with mergers.
In our study of downstream mergers, we rule out these effects by assuming that
downstream firms are symmetric, so that we can focus on the new effects that arise
from vertical relationships.
Analyzing mergers of symmetric downstream firms in a successive oligopoly
model under a general demand function we have found that mergers can increase
welfare if they decrease equilibrium input prices. We have identified the necessary
and sufficient condition for reduction in input prices. We have explored two chan-
nels through which a reduction in input prices (induced by the merger) can lead
to higher welfare. First, in the presence of cost asymmetry in the upstream sector,
a lower input price increases the competitive advantage of cost-efficient upstream
firms, thereby reallocating some input production from cost-inefficient firms to cost-
efficient ones. Second, in the presence of fixed entry costs in the upstream sector,
a lower input price makes upstream entry less attractive, thereby rationalizing the
upstream sector. Both of these two effects lower average costs in the upstream
sector and work in the direction of increasing welfare. For each scenario, we have
identified the necessary and sufficient condition for downstream mergers to improve
welfare. Also, we have shown that the qualitative nature of our results remain
mostly unchanged for upstream mergers.
Although we have ruled out production reshuﬄing and synergy or learning effects
associated with horizontal mergers, they play important roles in the assessment of
their welfare effects. Along with these effects, the two new effects that we have iden-
tified, production reallocation and rationalization effects, will together help us more
accurately assess welfare effects of horizontal mergers in which vertical relationships
are important and can be approximated by successive oligopoly models.
P = 1 − Qb where d = b − 1. Fix N > 3. It is always possible to choose b and K suitably large
such that (28) holds.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Totally differentiating equation (4) we get
[(N + 1)gX(X
∗,M) +X∗gXX(X∗,M)] dX∗+(NgM(X∗,M) +X∗gXM(X∗,M)) dM = 0,
where
g(X∗,M) = P (X∗) +
X∗P ′(X∗)
M
gM(X
∗,M) = −X
∗P ′(X∗)
M2
,
gX(X
∗,M) =
P ′(X∗)(M + 1 + d)
M
,
gXM(X
∗,M) = −P
′(X∗)(1 + d)
M2
and d =
X∗P ′′(X∗)
P ′(X∗) . Substituting these derivatives above and rearranging yields
dX∗
dM
=
(
X∗
M
)[
N + 1 + d
(M + 1 + d)(N + 1 + u)
]
.
where u =
X∗gXX(X∗,M)
gX(X∗,M)
.
Since r∗ ≡ g(X∗,M) we have that
dr∗
dM
= gX(X
∗,M)
dX∗
dM
+ gM(X
∗,M).
Substituting the expressions for gX(X
∗,M), gM(X∗,M) and dX
∗
dM
in the right-hand
side of the above equation and simplifying we get:
dr∗
dM
=
(−X∗P ′(X∗)
M2
)(
u − d
N + 1 + u
)
.
Since P ′(X∗) < 0 and N + 1 + u > 0 (Assumption 2) it follows that
dr∗
dM
> (=, <)0⇔ u − d > (=, <)0.
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The rest of the proof is devoted to establishing that
sign(u − d) = signdd
dQ
where all expressions are evaluated at Q(≡ X) = X∗. Substituting gX(X∗,M) =
(M+1)P ′(X∗)+X∗P ′′(X∗)
M
and gXX(X
∗,M) = (M+2)P
′(X∗)+X∗P ′′′(X∗)
M
in the expression for
u =
X∗gXX(X∗,M)
gX(X∗,M)
and simplifying we get
u =
X∗P ′′(X∗)(M + 2 + α)
P ′(X∗)(M + 1 + d)
= d +
d(1 + α− d)
M + 1 + d
,
where α = X
∗P ′′′(X∗)
P ′′(X∗) . Since M + 1 + d > 0 it follows that
sign(u − d) = sign(d(1 + α− d)).
Differentiating d ≡ QP ′′QP ′(Q) with respect to Q and evaluating at Q = X∗ we get
dd
dQ
=
P ′(X∗)(P ′′(X∗) +X∗P ′′′(X∗))−X∗(P ′′(X∗))2
(P ′(X∗))2
which upon simplification gives
dd
dQ
=
P ′′(X∗)(1 + α− d)
P ′(X∗)
=
d(1 + α− d)
X∗
.
The result then follows from observing that
sign
dd
dQ
= sign(d(1 + α− d)) = sign(u − d)
where all expressions are evaluated at Q(≡ X) = X∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 respectively imply that M+1+d > 0 and N+1+
u > 0. Since M + 1 + d > 0 holds for all M ≥ 1, it holds for M = N where N ≥ 1.
Thus N + 1 + d > 0 and consequently
dX∗
dM
> 0. Furthermore, since P ′(X∗) < 0 we
have that dCS
dM
= −P ′(X∗)X∗ dX∗
dM
> 0. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Expand (10) as
dW
dM
=
N∑
k=1
(P ∗ − ck)dx
∗
k
dM
= (P ∗ − r∗)dX
∗
dM
+
N∑
k=1
(r∗ − ck)dx
∗
k
dM
. (29)
Rearranging (1) and (3) we have that
P ∗ − r∗ = −P ′(X∗)q∗ = −X
∗P ′(X∗)
M
,
r∗ − ck = gX(X∗,M)x∗k.
Differentiating (3) with respect to M and rearranging we have that
dx∗k
dM
=
X∗
M(M + 1 + d)
[
1 + s∗k(1 + d)−
(1 + s∗ku)(N + 1 + d)
N + 1 + u
]
,
Substituting these expressions and dX
∗
dM
from (7) in (29) and simplifying we get that
dW
dM
= −
(
P ′X∗2
M(N + 1 + u)
){
N + 1 + d
M + 1 + d
+(u−d)+H[(N+1+u)(1+d)−u(N+1+d)]
}
.
Since N + 1 + u > 0 (by Assumption 2), it follows that:
dW
dM
< 0 ⇔ N + 1 + d
M + 1 + d
+ (u − d) +H[(N + 1 + u)(1 + d)− u(N + 1 + d)] < 0,
⇔ 1 + N + 1 + d
M + 1 + d
+H(1 + d)− (NH − 1)(u − d − 1) < 0,
⇔ u − d > 1 +
1
H
(1 + N+1+d
M+1+d
) + 1 + d
N − 1
H
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Substituting (16) into (15) and simplifying we get
−gX(Xˆ,M)X2 = Nˆ2K
32
which upon total differentiation gives:
−
(
gXX(Xˆ,M)X
2 + 2gX(Xˆ,M)X
)
dXˆ − gXM(Xˆ,M)Xˆ2 = 2NˆKdNˆ. (30)
Using gXM(Xˆ,M) = −P ′(Xˆ)(1+d)M2 , d = XˆP
′′(Xˆ)
P ′(Xˆ)
and u =
XˆgXX(Xˆ,M)
gX(Xˆ,M)
we can write
(30)as
(2 + u)
(
∂Xˆ
∂M
+
∂Xˆ
∂N
dNˆ
dM
)
− Xˆ(1 + d)
M(M + 1 + d)
=
2Xˆ
Nˆ
dNˆ
dM
. (31)
We have that
∂Xˆ
∂M
=
Xˆ(Nˆ + 1 + d)
M(M + 1 + d)(Nˆ + 1 + u)
.
∂Xˆ
∂N
=
Xˆ
Nˆ(Nˆ + 1 + u)
.
Substituting these expressions in (31) and rearranging yields equation (17) of the
text:
dNˆ
dM
=
(
Nˆ
M
)(
1
2Nˆ + u
)[
Nˆ + 1 + d + Nˆ(u − d)
M + 1 + d
]
,
Using (17) and the expressions for ∂Xˆ
∂M
and ∂Xˆ
∂N
from above, we get:
dXˆ
dM
=
∂Xˆ
∂M
+
∂Xˆ
∂N
dNˆ
dM
=
Xˆ(2Nˆ + 1 + d)
M(2Nˆ + u)(M + 1 + d)
. (32)
Assumption 1 implies that M + 1 + d > 0 as well as 2Nˆ + 1 + d > 2 + d > 0.
Assumption 2 implies that 2Nˆ + u ≥ Nˆ + 1 + u > 0. Thus dXˆdM > 0 which in turn
proves Proposition 4.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
Differentiating rˆ ≡ g(Xˆ,M) totally we get
drˆ
dM
= gX(Xˆ,M)
dXˆ
dM
+ gM(Xˆ,M).
Using the expression for dXˆ
dM
from (17), gX(Xˆ,M) =
P ′(Xˆ)(M+1+d)
M
and gM(Xˆ,M) =
33
− XˆP ′(Xˆ)
M2
we get
drˆ
dM
= (
P ′(Xˆ)(M + 1 + d)
M
)(
Xˆ(2Nˆ + 1 + d)
M(2Nˆ + u)(M + 1 + d)
)− XˆP
′(Xˆ)
M2
which upon simplification gives
drˆ
dM
=
−P ′(Xˆ)Xˆ(u − d − 1)
M2(2Nˆ + u)
. (33)
Proposition 5 immediately follows from the expression of drˆ
dM
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Differentiating W with respect to M yields
dW
dM
= (P − r) dXˆ
dM
− Xˆ drˆ
dM
.
dW
dM
= −Xˆ
2P ′
M2
{[
(Nˆ + u)(u − d)− (Nˆ + 1 + d)
(Nˆ + 1 + u)(2Nˆ + u)
]
(M + 2 + d)− 1
}
= −Xˆ
2P ′
M2
[(
u − d − 1
2Nˆ + u
)
(M + 2 + d)− 1
] (34)
Since −Xˆ2P ′/M2 > 0, dW/dM < 0 is equivalent to the following condition
u − d − 1
2Nˆ + u
>
1
M + 2 + d
. (35)
The result then follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
From the first-order condition of the profit maximization problem in the downstream
sector we get
q∗k = −
P ∗ − r∗ − ak
P ′(X∗)
,
34
where k = 1, 2, ...,M and X∗ satisfies the following
Ng(X∗,M)−Nc+X∗gX(X∗,M) = 0.
and P ∗ ≡ P (X∗) and r ≡ g(X∗,M). We have that
dq∗k
dN
= −P
′(X∗)d(P
∗−r∗)
dN
− P ′′(X∗)(P ∗ − r∗ − ak)dX∗dN
(P ′((X∗))2
.
Substituting the expressions for d(P
∗−r∗)
dN
and dX
∗
dN
from (22) in the above equation
and simplifying subsequently we get:
dq∗k
dN
= − X
∗
N(N + 1 + u)
(
1 + d
M
− skd
)
. (36)
We have that
dW
dN
=
M∑
k=1
(P ∗ − ak − c)dq
∗
k
dN
,
=
M∑
k=1
(P ∗ − r∗ − ak)dq
∗
k
dN
+ (r∗ − c)dX
∗
dN
. (37)
Substituting P ∗ − r∗ − ak = −P ′(X∗)q∗k, r∗ − c = −gX(X
∗,M)X∗
N
,
dq∗k
dN
from (36) and
dX∗
dN
from (22) in the above equation and simplifying we get
dW
dN
= − P
′(X∗)X∗2
N(N + 1 + u)
(
1 + d
M
+
M + 1 + d
MN
−Hdd
)
.
Given P ′(X∗) < 0,
dW
dN
< 0⇔ d(Hd − 1
M
) >
M +N + 1 + d
MN
,
where Hd =
M∑
k=1
(sk)
2 is the Herfindahl index for the downstream sector.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
We have that
dW
dN
= (rˆ − c)dXˆ
dN
− Xˆ d(Pˆ − rˆ)
dN
.
35
First we derive d(Pˆ−rˆ)
dN
. When ai = a for all i = 1, 2, ...,M , the input demand function
is
r = P (X)− a+ XP
′(X)
M
≡ g(X,M).
Rearranging the above equation and evaluating at the free entry equilibrium values,
we get:
Pˆ − rˆ = a− XˆP
′(Xˆ)
Mˆ
.
Differentiating Pˆ − rˆ with respect to N gives:
d(Pˆ − rˆ)
dN
=
XˆP ′(Xˆ)
Mˆ2
dMˆ
dN
− P
′(Xˆ)(1 + d)
M
dXˆ
dN
. (38)
Differentiating (24) and rearranging we get:
dXˆ
dN
=
2Xˆ
(2 + d)Mˆ
dMˆ
dN
. (39)
Using (39), we can rewrite (38) as:
d(Pˆ − rˆ)
dN
= −dP
′(Xˆ)
2M
dXˆ
dN
. (40)
Using (40) and rˆ − c = −gX(Xˆ,Mˆ)Xˆ
Nˆ
= −P ′(Xˆ)(Mˆ+1+d
MˆNˆ
we get
dW
dN
= (rˆ − c)dXˆ
dN
− Xˆ d(Pˆ − rˆ)
dN
,
=
XˆP ′(Xˆ)
M
(
d
2
− Mˆ + 1 + d
N
)
dXˆ
dN
,
=
XˆP ′(Xˆ)(N − 2)
2MˆN
(
d − 2(Mˆ + 1)
N − 2
)
dXˆ
dN
. (41)
Recall we focus on parameterizations where dMˆ
dN
> 0.15 Since d > −2 it follows
15Totally differentiating (24) and (25) and rearranging we get: dMˆdN =
(rˆ−c)(2+d)Mˆ
2∆Xˆ
, where ∆ =
−P ′(Xˆ)[(Mˆ+1+d)(N+1+u)−(2+d)(N+1+d)]2M . Observe that ∆ > 0 ⇔ dMˆdN > 0. Note that u − d ≥
0 ⇒ ∆ > 0. From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that signdddQ = sign(u − d). Thus,
dd
dQ ≥ 0 ⇒ u − d ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆ > 0 ⇒ dMˆdN > 0. In other words, dMˆdN > 0 holds for all demand
functions with increasing elasticity of slope.
36
from (39) that dXˆ
dN
> 0. Since P ′(Xˆ) < 0 and dXˆ
dN
> 0, it is immediate from (41) that
dW
dN
< 0⇔ d > 2(Mˆ + 1)
N − 2 .
Q.E.D.
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